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 ABSTRACT    
 
This paper provides insight into some important features of the intergenerational resource 
allocation in Korea, before and after the financial crisis in 1997-98. Data sets of three periods before 
and after the financial crisis (1996, 2000, and 2005) were used to compare the results. This research 
particularly addresses two related issues: i) the generational effects of economic crisis, and ii) the 
capacity of age reallocation systems to spread economic risks across generations. The results show 
tremendous consumption smoothing and resource reallocation by age, during and after the financial 
crisis. Private education and private health consumption decreased for children between 1996 and 
2000. However, the decrease in private education and private health consumption was mitigated by 
the increase in public consumption. It appears that the public sector did not only mitigate the adverse 
impact of the economic crisis on consumption, but it also reduced the widening disparity amongst 
generations. Within transfers, the public transfers for the elderly increased substantially as the private 
transfers decreased rapidly. Finally, there was a big increase in the asset-based reallocation of the 
elderly. The increase in asset-based reallocation was mainly due to an increase in asset income 
between 1996 and 2000, but it was almost entirely due to a decrease in saving (i.e. an increase in dis-
saving) between 2000 and 2005. This suggests that Korean elderly seemed to have some degree of 
supporting system during the crisis, even without sufficient pension benefits. The increased reliance 
on asset accumulation will be critical in the long-run in Korea, as public pension funds diminish due 
to population aging. 
 
 
 
 
본 연구에서는 1996년과 2000년, 2005년의
국민이전계정(National Transfer Accounts)을
이용하여 1997년 말 외환위기와 2000년 이후
의 급속한 인구구조 고령화가 세대 간 재배분
에 미친 영향에 대해 분석하였다. 국민이전계
정은 국민계정과 일관되게 거시적 수준에서 세
대 간 이전(intergenerational transfers)을 측
정하는 회계방식이다. 국민이전계정을 통해 외
환위기와 인구고령화가 세대 간 재배분에 미친
영향을 살펴본 결과는 다음과 같이 요약된다. 
1) 유년층(0~19세)의 민간소비(보건, 교육)는
크게 감소한 반면, 공공소비(보건, 교육)는 증
가하였다. 2) 노년층(65세 이상)의 공적이전
(public transfers)은 증가한 반면, 사적이전
(private transfers)은 감소하였다. 3) 노년층
의 자산재배분이 크게 증가하였다. 경제위기
에도 불구하고 총소비는 크게 위축되지 않은 
것으로 파악되는데, 이는 정부의 확대재정정
책에 의한 공공소비의 증가가 총소비를 일정 
수준으로 유지(consumption smoothing)
시킬 수 있었기 때문이다. 한편, 노년층의 
경우 우리나라의 국민연금제도가 아직 미성
숙함에도 불구하고 자산축적을 통해 스스로 
노후를 대비하고 있는 것으로 파악되었다. 
자신의 노후소득을 마련하기 위해 자산축적
이 지속적으로 활발하게 이루어질 경우 향
후 급속한 인구고령화에 의한 공적연금의 
재정부담을 경감시켜 줄 수 있을 것이다. 
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I . Introduction 
 
 
Korea survived the brunt of the crisis in 1997-98, but it was faced with numerous 
socioeconomic problems that emerged during and following the crisis. The most 
serious problems included the rising numbers of disadvantaged people, employment 
instability, the widening gap between the rich and the poor, and rapid deterioration 
of familial support for the elderly. Even long after the affected economies recovered, 
social impacts continue to be felt. 
During and after the crisis, there has been great change in the Korean economy 
and economic support system. There has been substantial fluctuation in the value of 
assets due to changes in the price of housing and equities. A lot of middle aged 
workers were forced to retire, and many of them were not able to re-enter the labor 
market even when the economic crisis was over. The reduction in new jobs made it 
difficult for young workers to find a regular job after graduating. On the other hand, 
there has been a great increase in social expenditure, mainly due to changes in the 
economic and social environments, as well as some political factors. Increasing social 
demands for welfare are recognized, especially since the economic crisis devastated 
the Korean economy. The expenditure is often age targeted, regardless of whether 
the Korean government intended this or not.  
At the same time, a rapid decline in fertility during and after the crisis appeared 
to be a new threat to the economy that accelerates the aging process of the society. 
The unprecedentedly fast population aging imposed a burden of old age support. 
Traditionally, the burden was borne by the income transferred from their grown-up 
children living with the elderly. But as the traditional familial support system has 
deteriorated, the number of families living with their aged parents has been 
declining. During the crisis, lots of families suffered from the economic difficulties, 
and, as a result, private transfers substantially diminished. However, the Korean 
government has increased the welfare budget in order to settle the problems of 
unemployment and poverty since the financial crisis. 
The origins of the Korean economic crisis in 1997-98 are complex. Many 
researchers pointed out several domestic, regional, and global elements, all of which 
contributed to generating it. The impact of the Korean economic crisis seems at least 
as complex as the origins are. In this paper, we focus on two related issues: Korea’s 
intergenerational economy before and after the crisis and the capacity of age 
reallocation systems to spread economic and financial risks across generations. The 
analysis makes use of the National Transfer Accounts (NTA) which provides 
comprehensive estimates of intergenerational economic flows. The analysis 
emphasizes the effects of the crisis on consumption and key components of 
consumption by age. A second level of analysis focuses on the economic flows that 
fund consumption. Value of assets and labor income are directly affected. Transfers 
and savings are indirectly influenced and may serve to mitigate the effects of 
economic crises. 
We use three periods of data, 1996, 2000, and 2005. The year 1996 is chosen 
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because it was soon before the financial crisis and it was also the year before entering 
the aging society. The year 2005 is the year after entering the aging society and it is 
the one showing the effect of the increased social policies. We try to compare them 
with the year 2000, which seems to be the year that unemployment rates began to 
recover and per capita income recovered to the level before the economic crisis. Thus, 
this study sets the years of 1996 and 2005 as comparison years to grasp the effect of 
population aging and the change of the intergenerational resource allocation due to 
the economic crisis.  
It should be mentioned that the methodology of comparing outcomes before and 
after the crisis has its own limitation because it is very difficult to identify the pure 
effect of any time-series event on an economy. This is in large part because there is 
no counterfactual event, and, hence, it is difficult to net out the effect of other 
economic events, policies, and trends from that of the crisis. On the other hand, some 
of these events, policies, and trends are outcomes of the financial crisis, which might 
have affected the following changes in intergenerational economy. Thus, although it 
is difficult to identify the net effect of the economic crisis, the crisis might have 
played the broader role of a catalyst, which might have had an effect on 
intergenerational resource reallocation.  
We also focus only on the short run impact of the economic crisis. The impact 
may have a persistent effect and the lifetime behavior of an individual at each 
generation might be governed by a lifetime budget constraint. The long run impact 
of a crisis can be analyzed by calculating the lifetime wealth effect of the economic 
crisis, for example by constructing a synthetic cohort measure.1 The lifetime impact 
of the economic crisis on each age/cohort group, however, is discussed elsewhere, in 
collaboration with other project country teams. On the other hand, the Korean 
economic crisis has been marked by sharp declines of very short duration, which 
might distinguish it from a long lasting economic recession. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the economic crisis 
and methodology. Section III discusses results. The last section concludes. 
 
 
II. Background 
 
 
1. Korea’s 1997-98 Economic Crisis 
 
Korea has had an extraordinary development experience until the mid 1990s. 
Between 1962 and 1996, real GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 6.6 percent, 
and per capita income soared from only $87 in 1962 to $12,197 in 1996. During the 
process of economic development, the investment and saving rate remained over 30 
percent. The rate of total savings in Korea increased continuously from 10 percent of 
GNP in the 1960s to 40.4 percent in 1988. Despite such high economic growth, 
inflation remained relatively low, at around 4 percent throughout the mid 1990s. 
However, late in 1997, shortly after Korea had become a member of the OECD, the 
                                            
1We would like to thank John M. Kim for his valuable comment on this. 
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[Figure 1] Key Macroeconomic Indicators: Quarterly, 1993 ¼ to 2009 ¼ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Korean economy experienced a severe economic crisis. Combined with a substantial 
depreciation in the exchange rate, per capita income plunged to US $7,355 in 1998. 
The changes in key macroeconomic indicators between the first quarter of 1993 
and the first quarter of 2009 are shown in Figure 1. The real per capita GDP growth 
rate ranged from 4.4 percent to 10.3 percent until the third quarter of 1997, but it 
decreased to 2.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 1997. The real growth rate fell to -5.3 
percent in the first quarter of 1998, which was the lowest growth rate in Korea since 
the political turmoil of the early 1980’s. The growth rated plunged to -8.1 percent in 
the third quarter of 1998. The GDP growth rate rebounded in 1999 and fully 
recovered to the pre-crisis level by the third quarter of 2000.  
Market interest rates, measured as the nominal interest rate for the 3-year 
corporate bond, soared to over 20 percent during the crisis. The interest rates sharply 
declined to below 10 percent in 1999 and maintained a decreasing trend until 2004. 
The decline in asset prices was also substantial during the crisis. The nominal value 
of land and housing respectively decreased by 9.5 percent and 11.4 percent in the 
second quarter of 1998, compared with the second quarter of 1997. For only one year 
in 1998, the average price of land and housing declined 14 percent and 12.4 percent 
respectively. Land and housing prices began to rise again in 1999. Interestingly, the 
housing price rose very rapidly after the crisis, much faster than the land prices. 
Between 2000-2003, the housing price increased over 35 percent, or 10 percent per 
annum. It rose again by 20 percent between 2004 and 2007. Unemployment rates 
increased from 2.2 percent in the third quarter of 1997 to 7.5 percent in the same 
quarter of 1998. Unemployment rates began to recover later; they started to recover 
in the second quarter of 2000, almost three years after the crisis.   
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[Figure 2] Other Socio-Economic Indicators: Annually, 1994-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the changes in more key socio-economic indicators, by year, 
which bear direct or indirect implications for the intergenerational economy. Most of 
all, the government debt has increased very rapidly since 1997. The government debt 
as a percentage of GDP increased from 8.8 percent in 1996 to 16.6 percent in 1998. It 
further increased to 22.9 percent in 2003 and reached to 33.4 percent of GDP in 2006. 
The rise in government debt during the crisis may not be surprising because public 
debt increases as governments attempt to maintain public spending in the face of 
declining revenues, and to employ fiscal policy in response to the economic crisis. In 
Korea, the government debt kept increasing after the crisis, especially between 2002 
and 2005, mainly due to the large increase in the exchange stabilization fund (ESF). 
ESF accounted for only 15 percent of all government debts in 2002, but the share 
increased to 40 percent as of 2005. Interestingly, public consumption has not declined, 
while private consumption sharply declined during the crisis, making a marked 
contrast. Again, this might suggest that the Korean government played a role in 
smoothing consumption during the crisis. The total fertility ratio (TFR) went down 
slightly from 1.58 in 1996 to 1.47 in 2000, but it plunged further, to 1.08, in 2005. The 
life expectancy (not shown in the figure) increased from 74.0 in 1996 to 76.0 in 2000, 
and it further increased to 78.6 in 2005. 
There were also substantial changes in population age structure before and after 
the crisis. Figure 3 shows the population distribution by age in Korea between 1996 
and 2005. The youth dependency ratio decreased from 22.9 percent in 1996 to 21.1 
percent in 2000, and dropped to 19.1 percent in 2005. On the other hand, the old age 
dependency ratio increased from 6.1 percent in 1996 to 7.2 percent in 2000, and 
increased again to 9.1 percent in 2005, entering the aging society. As a result, the  
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[Figure 3] Population Age Structure: 1996, 2000, and 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
population age structure in Korea has changed substantially during a short period of 
time. 
 
 
2. Application of National Transfers Accounts (NTA) in Korea 
 
The purpose of National Transfer Accounts (NTA) is to measure at the aggregate 
level, in a manner consistent with National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), 
the reallocations across age of economic resources. The methodological details are 
not discussed here, but some important aspects for constructing estimates are as 
follows.  
The young and the old have a lifecycle deficit because they produce less through 
their labor than they consume. Working-age adults have a lifecycle surplus because 
they produce far more through their labor than they consume. Age reallocations 
occur because of this; at some ages individuals consume more than they produce, 
while at other ages individuals produce more than they consume. The reallocation 
system consists of a set of complex institutions and practices by which the young and 
the old, those with lifecycle deficits, draw on the surplus resources generated during 
the prime working ages (Lee 1994a, 1994b).  
The economic mechanisms used for age reallocations fall into two broad 
categories: transfers and asset-based reallocations. A defining feature of transfers is 
that they involve no explicit quid pro quo, or exchange of money for goods or 
services. Resources flow from one party to another either voluntarily, in the case of 
private transfers, or as public transfers. Asset-based reallocations realize inter-age 
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flows through inter-temporal exchange. For example, an asset such as gold can be 
acquired in one period generating an outflow at that age, and disposed of in a 
subsequent period generating an inflow at an older age. More generally asset-based 
reallocations involve two kinds of flows – asset income and saving. When 
individuals accumulate pension funds or personal saving during their working years 
and rely on asset income and dis-saving of those assets during their non-working 
years, they are relying on asset-based reallocations. Or when individuals borrow to 
finance their education, they are relying on asset-based reallocations to shift 
resources to young ages, when they are in need, from older ages. Readers interested 
in methodological details might benefit by reading Lee, Lee, and Mason (2008), 
Mason et al. (2009), http://www.ntaccounts.org/. Readers interested in Korea’s 
public sector generational accounting may also benefit by reading Chun 
(forthcoming).  
A variety of micro data sets are required to construct the age profiles of NTA. To 
construct the age profiles for our study, income and expenditure surveys, such as the 
National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (NSHIE), Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), Korean Household Panel Study (KHPS) and 
Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) are used. It is important to 
understand that the numbers estimated from the micro data sets are used to 
construct the age profiles, but the numbers are adjusted by aggregate macro controls. 
For this purpose, we use NIPA and the records of public institutions, including but 
not limited to National Pension Statistical Yearbook, National Health Insurance 
Statistical Yearbook, National Tax Statistical Yearbook, Yearly Statistics of 
Employment Insurance, Statistical Yearbook of Health and Welfare, and Statistical 
Yearbook of Teachers Pension.  
A brief explanation for primary micro data sets is as follows. NSHIE started in 
1991 and has been released every five years. This survey provides information on 
yearly income and expenditures, durable goods, assets, and liabilities of households 
in detail from the nationally representative household sample. The sample size is 
about 27,000 households. The Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 
has been conducted with non-farm households excluding one person households in 
cities during the past sixty or so years, and in 2003 it was expanded to include rural 
non-farm households. Beginning in 2005, one person households are also included. 
Hence, it should be mentioned that the changing consumption pattern between 2000 
and 2005 could be due to the changing coverage of households between the two 
surveys. The purpose of HIES is to collect up-to-date information on household 
income and expenditures and to analyze variations in the levels of living and the 
disparities among different socio-economic groups, and to obtain weights for the 
consumer price index.  
KHPS is the first panel data in Korea. The sixth wave has been released from the 
first study in 1993. It covers minutely the income and expenditures of the whole 
household, and the income and taxes of all over 18 years of age, except for the 
residents of Cheju Island. KLIPS, started in 1998, is the longitudinal survey of 
households and individuals residing in urban areas, on their labor market and 
income activities. The KLIPS sample had been selected from households that lived in 
the 7 metropolitan cities as well as urban areas in 8 provinces, again excluding Cheju  
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<Table 1> Estimation Methods and Data Sources 
NTA Estimation methods Data Sources 
Education, private Regress on enrollment and age NSHIE, HIES 
Health, private Regress on age NSHIE, HIES 
Imputed-rent, Others, private Equivalence scale NSHIE, HIES 
Education, public Age- & education level- specific enrollment rate OECD 
Health, public Age distribution of benefits NHISY 
Others, public Per capita basis NIPA 
Compensation of employees Wage of wage workers KLIPS, KHPS 
Entrepreneurial income Income of non-wage workers KLIPS, KHPS 
Asset income, private Net property income of households NSHIE, HIES 
Savings, private Residuals Calculation 
Asset income & financial asset 
Accumulation, public Age distribution of tax burden NIPA 
Capital and  
land accumulation, public Age distribution of population NIPA 
Social insurance & tax Generational accounting NIPA 
Inter-household transfers Private subsidy and remittance of households NSHIE, HIES 
Intra-household transfers Net transfers=consumption - disposable income KHPS 
 
 
Island. The sample size was originally 5,000 households and 13,321 individuals, and 
has diminished since then. The primary data sets and methods used by items of NTA 
are summarized in Table 1. 
 
 
III. Results 
 
 
1. Economic Lifecycle 
 
The age profiles of consumption and labor income – the economic lifecycle – 
reflect many factors (Lee, Lee, and Mason 2008). One of the most important factors is 
population age structure. Reallocations to children are much more important than  
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[Figure 4] Lifecycle Profiles of Per Capita Labor Income and Consumption:  
1996, 2000, and 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
reallocations to the elderly in current-day Korea because there are many more 
children than elderly. But Korea is aging rapidly and therefore reallocations to the 
elderly, as compared with reallocations to children, will increase substantially over 
the coming decades. The economic lifecycle also reflects behavior and the factors that 
influence behavior – prices, taxes, tastes, etc. Consumption profiles, for example, are 
influenced by the importance of education as compared to health care – and the 
institutional framework that governs these important sectors. Labor income profiles 
vary with the wage system, the returns to education, educational attainment, the 
ages at which children leave school and adults retire, and the labor force decisions 
made by women – to mention a few obvious factors.  
Figure 4 shows the lifecycle profile of per capita labor income and consumption 
in Korea for 1996, 2000, and 2005. The labor income peaked at age 38 in 1996, but it 
declined to 35 in 2000. It bounced back slightly, to 37, in 2005.2 The mean age of labor 
income and median age of labor income showed a similar pattern. The mean age of 
labor income declined from 42.2 in 1996 to 41.3 in 2000. It increased slightly, back 
to 42.0, in 2005. The median age of labor income declined from 40 to 39 between 
1996 and 2000, but recovered to the pre-crisis level, 40, in 2005. The share of labor 
income for elderly ages 65 and older declined substantially from 4.1 percent in 1996 
to 2.3 percent in 2000, and slightly increased to 2.7 percent in 2005. This consistent 
pattern means that the share of labor income for the prime age adults or elderly 
                                            
2Labor income peaks much earlier in Korea than in many other advanced countries, and it was excelled 
during the economic crisis. This in part reflects that the labor income peaks quite early for women in Korea. 
Note that the shape of the figure is dependent upon various components of labor income as well.  
Economic Crisis and Intergenerational Economy: Lessons from Korea’s 1997~98 Economic Crisis    37 
 
 
population must have declined compared with the share for young people. This is 
also consistent with the notion that the unique seniority-based wage system in Korea 
has been rapidly deteriorating during the 1990s, especially after the 1997 economic 
crisis.  
The figure also shows that consumption peaks in the late teens and decreases 
until the 40s. Such a decline in consumption was also found in other countries as a 
result of decreasing expenditure on education. However, the decline seems to come 
earlier in Korea, immediately after high school graduation. This result may be related 
to the extremely high level of private education consumption among high school 
students in Korea, which is supported by the data. The peak of consumption at 
senior high is much more prominent in 2005. 
As is clear from the figure, while the labor income profile has shifted little 
between 1996 and 2000, it increased substantially between 2000 and 2005. However, 
consumption has modestly increased between 1996 and 2000, and again substantially 
between 2000 and 2005. Both results are interesting because this suggests that the 
impact of the economic crisis on consumption might have been mitigated. The 
combined effect of the change in age profiles of labor income and consumption 
changed the lifecycle deficit years. It indicates that the lifecycle surplus decreased 
from 33 years in 1996 (age 23 to 55) to 31 years in 2000 (age 24 to 54), and remained 
the same in 2005 (age 25 to 55).  
Figure 5 charts the age profile of labor income and consumption relative to 
average labor income for adults aged 30-49 each year. That is, Figure 5 was drawn in 
a way that Figure 4 was rescaled by dividing by the simple average of per capita 
production between ages 30-49. This normalization makes the estimated profiles 
more easily comparable by age and also by time period. We divided each age 
schedule by the un-weighted average of per capita labor income of each age over the 
range 30 to 49. Thus, for example, a value of 0.5 at some age in consumption implies 
that a person at that age consumes half the annual amount of production averaged 
over the prime ages of her life. So it can present the changing pattern of age profiles 
or age targeting of government programs more clearly. The figure suggests that the 
labor income of elderly aged 65 and older declined substantially between 1996 and 
2000, while it was stagnant between 2000 and 2005, compared to that of ages 30-49. 
In addition, the labor income of prime age adults appears to have declined between 
1996 and 2000. The figure also shows that the normalized per capita consumption 
increased for almost all ages between 1996 and 2000, while it was stagnant between 
2000 and 2005. The only notable difference between 2000 and 2005 is that the 
consumption of children under 20 years , normalized by the average labor income 
ages 30 to 49, has increased substantially. On the other hand, the normalized 
consumption increased for all ages between 1996 and 2000, suggesting a potential 
consumption smoothing during the period.  
A further investigation of the consumption by component shows some 
interesting features. Table 2 presents real annual growth rates of each consumption 
component and labor income by broad age group. While per capita labor income 
increased by only 0.7 percent per annum between 1996 and 2000, per capita labor 
income for ages 65 and older decreased by 10.7 percent per annum during the same 
period. On the other hand, total consumption rose by 3.7 percent per annum,  
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<Table 2> Annual Growth Rate of Consumption and Labor Income: By Broad Age 
Groups  
(unit: %) 
  
Annual growth between 
1996-2000 
Annual growth between  
2000-2005 
  0~19 20~64 65+ 
per 
capita 0~19 20~64 65+ 
per 
capita 
Total Consumption 2.6 4.2 2.7 3.7 6.4 3.6 4.0 4.4 
Public Consumption 3.7 4.4 6.6 4.0 9.0 6.9 7.1 7.4 
   Public Education 3.4    12.2    
   Public Health 9.4 9.1 14.5 10.6 8.2 10.6 8.9 10.6 
   Public Others 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
           
Private Consumption 2.1 4.1 1.6 3.6 5.0 2.8 3.0 3.4 
   Private Education -3.8 .. .. .. 10.6 .. .. .. 
   Private Health -2.9 -1.2 1.4 -0.3 22.5 6.3 8.3 9.2 
   Housing -1.4 1.6 5.6 1.9 4.1 1.3 -1.0 2.0 
   Private Others 5.1 4.0 0.9 4.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.9 
           
Labor Income 2.7 0.3 -10.7 0.7 -13.4 3.3 3.2 3.7 
   Compensation 2.6 0.0 -14.1 0.4 -13.5 4.6 6.9 5.0 
   Self-Employed Income 46.2 2.1 -2.8 2.5 4.8 -6.0 -4.9 -5.4 
 
 
too. The private health consumption for children ages 0-19 grew 22.5 percent per 
annum during the period. For ages 0-24, it increased by 20.2 percent per annum.  
 
 
2. Reallocation System 
 
Reallocation systems, which is the way of funding to fill the gap between 
consumption and labor income, vary along two important dimensions: the 
governing or mediating institution and the economic form of the reallocation (Lee, 
1994a; 1994b). The public sector reallocates resources relying on social mandates 
embodied in law and regulation and implemented by local, regional, and national 
governments. Education, public pensions, and health care programs are important 
examples of public reallocation programs. Private sector reallocations are governed 
by voluntary contracts, social conventions, etc. that are mediated by households, 
families, charitable organizations, and other private institutions. Important examples 
of private reallocations are private saving and credit transactions and familial 
support to children and the elderly. The results are explained in turn using the 
following figures.   
It is not surprising that transfers dominate the reallocation of wealth to children 
in any economy, because asset reallocation is not the usual mechanism for 
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supporting consumption by young children. Although Korea is no exception, 
familial transfer to children in Korea is particularly prominent, given the high level 
of private education consumption by high school students. Public transfers to 
children are getting more important, especially since the recovery from economic 
crisis, due to the rapid increase in public education consumption. Familial transfers 
for the elderly trend upward with age too, but net familial transfers for the elderly 
decreased dramatically between 2000 and 2005 (figures 6 and 7). The drastic decrease 
in familial transfers during the period is largely due to the difference in growth rate 
between inflows and outflows. That is, the outflows grew much faster than inflows 
for elderly, which might be also related with the change in asset-based reallocation 
for the elderly, as described below.  
The most striking feature of the change in transfers was the rapid increase in 
social welfare expenditure (Not shown in the figure). In addition to public health 
expenditure, social assistance benefits increased for all age groups, amounting to 18.9 
percent per annum between 1996 and 2000, and 13.3 percent per annum between 
2000 and 2005, in real terms. It might be because of the expansion of the National 
Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS) benefits system in 2000, which consists of 
cash and in-kind benefits to households with incomes below the poverty line. Social 
security related expenditure also grew rapidly, especially for the elderly. Social 
security inflows grew by 7 percent per annum between 1996 and 2000, and it further 
increased by 16.3 percent per annum between 2000 and 2005.  
Private asset-based reallocations were positive at most ages, except for ages in the 
20s and 30s in Korea over the period (Figure 8). At those ages, asset income was 
equal to or smaller than saving. Younger people, those aged 15–20, were dis-saving, 
but at a trivial level. Private asset income was rising steeply among people in their 
40s and 50s. But their private savings were always quite low compared with their 
asset income. Perhaps the reason for their low savings is that people in this age 
group were financing much of the consumption of children and the elderly.4  
A striking result is the huge increase in asset-based reallocation (asset income 
minus saving) for the elderly between 1996 and 2000, and again between 2000 and 
2005. Quite surprisingly, the increase in asset-based reallocation is mainly due to an 
increase in asset income between 1996 and 2000, while it was entirely due to a 
decrease in saving (an increase in dis-saving) between 2000 and 2005 (figures 9 and 
10). The increase in asset income among older people between 1996 and 2000 was 
largely due to an increase in net inflow of interest and other property income for 
those age groups, while capital income was still a most important source of asset 
income for Koreans of all age groups.  
What are the major sources of the large swings in asset income and saving during 
the financial crisis and after the recovery? It is premature to speculate at this moment, 
and it is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is worthwhile to mention 
that it must be related to the speculation in real estate which became a serious social 
issue in Korea right after the financial crisis. The lowering interest rate between 2000 
and 2005 may have affected the huge decline in saving behavior for the elderly 
                                            
4Or it could be simply due to the fact that our results are based on cross-sectional rather than 
longitudinal data. See Mason et al. (2009) regarding this issue. 
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<Table 3> National Transfer Accounts, Aggregate Values by Broad Age Groups: 
1996, 2000, and 2005 
<1996> 
(unit: Billion won) 
 Total 0~19 20~64 65+ 
Life Cycle Deficit 
  
(12,590) 
  
74,873  
  
(99,717) 
  
12,254  
  Total Consumption 
  
263,878  
  
78,979  
  
168,848  
  
16,050  
    Public Consumption 
  
58,089  
  
24,914  
  
29,902  
  
3,273  
    Private Consumption 
  
205,789  
  
54,066  
  
138,946  
  
12,777  
 Labor Income (Less) 
  
276,467  
  
4,106  
  
268,565  
  
3,796  
      
Age Reallocations 
  
(12,590) 
  
74,873  
  
(99,717) 
  
12,254  
   Transfers 
  
(161) 
  
76,174  
  
(85,453) 
  
9,118  
     Net Public Transfers 
  
0  
  
19,671  
  
(22,917) 
  
3,246  
        Public Transfer Inflows 
  
78,261  
  
28,273  
  
43,202  
  
6,787  
        Public Transfer Outflows 
  
(78,261) 
  
(8,602) 
  
(66,119) 
  
(3,541) 
   Private Transfers, net 
  
(161) 
  
56,503  
  
(62,537) 
  
5,872  
  Asset-Based Reallocations 
  
(12,428) 
  
(1,301) 
  
(14,263) 
  
3,136  
    Public Asset Based Reallocation 
  
(36,379) 
  
(3,998) 
  
(30,735) 
  
(1,646) 
       Public asset income 
  
4,832  
  
531  
  
4,082  
  
219  
       Less: Public Saving 
  
41,210  
  
4,529  
  
34,817  
  
1,865  
  Private Asset Based Reallocation 
  
23,951  
  
2,697  
  
16,472  
  
4,782  
       Private asset income 
  
96,256  
  
54  
  
87,572  
  
8,631  
       Less: Private Saving 
  
72,306  
  
(2,644) 
  
71,100  
  
3,849  
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<Table 3> Continue 
<2000> 
(unit: Billion won) 
 Total 0~19 20~64 65+ 
Life Cycle Deficit 
  
21,299  
  
79,505  
  
(76,930) 
  
18,725  
  Total Consumption 
  
314,706  
  
83,887  
  
209,161  
  
21,658  
    Public Consumption 
  
70,098  
  
27,608  
  
37,358  
  
5,133  
    Private Consumption 
  
244,609  
  
56,280  
  
171,804  
  
16,525  
 Labor Income (Less) 
  
293,407  
  
4,382  
  
286,092  
  
2,933  
   
  
-  
  
-  
  
-  
Age Reallocations 
  
21,299  
  
79,505  
  
(76,930) 
  
18,725  
   Transfers 
  
644  
  
82,629  
  
(94,698) 
  
12,713  
     Net Public Transfers 
  
-  
  
23,326  
  
(29,746) 
  
6,420  
        Public Transfer Inflows 
  
102,278  
  
33,052  
  
57,915  
  
11,310  
        Public Transfer Outflows 
  
(102,278) 
  
(9,726) 
  
(87,661) 
  
(4,891) 
   Private Transfers, net 
  
644  
  
59,303  
  
(64,952) 
  
6,294  
  Asset-Based Reallocation 
  
20,655  
  
(3,124) 
  
17,768  
  
6,012  
    Public Asset Based Reallocation 
  
(49,731) 
  
(4,729) 
  
(42,624) 
  
(2,378) 
       Public asset income 
  
9,047  
  
860  
  
7,754  
  
433  
       Less: Public Saving 
  
58,777  
  
5,589  
  
50,378  
  
2,810  
  Private Asset Based Reallocation 
  
70,386  
  
1,605  
  
60,392  
  
8,389  
       Private asset income 
  
125,337  
  
30  
  
108,075  
  
17,231  
       Less: Private Saving 
  
54,951  
  
(1,575) 
  
47,684  
  
8,842  
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<Table 3> Continue 
<2005> 
(unit: Billion won) 
 Total 0~19 20~64 65+ 
Life Cycle Deficit 
  
38,405  
  
101,112  
  
(92,255) 
  
29,549  
  Total Consumption 
  
399,109  
  
103,036  
  
262,116  
  
33,958  
    Public Consumption 
  
102,452  
  
38,315  
  
54,843  
  
9,294  
    Private Consumption 
  
296,657  
  
64,720  
  
207,273  
  
24,664  
 Labor Income (Less) 
  
360,704  
  
1,924  
  
354,371  
  
4,409  
   
  
-  
  
-  
  
-  
Age Reallocations 
  
38,405  
  
101,112  
  
(92,255) 
  
29,549  
   Transfers 
  
(2,267) 
  
101,684  
  
(113,699) 
  
9,747  
     Net Public Transfers 
  
(0) 
  
34,795  
  
(44,116) 
  
9,321  
        Public Transfer Inflows 
  
157,144  
  
46,036  
  
93,729  
  
17,379  
        Public Transfer Outflows 
  
(157,144) 
  
(11,242) 
  
(137,845) 
  
(8,057) 
   Private Transfers, net 
  
(2,267) 
  
66,890  
  
(69,583) 
  
426  
  Asset-Based Reallocation 
  
40,672  
  
(573) 
  
21,444  
  
19,801  
    Public Asset Based Reallocation 
  
(50,380) 
  
(3,604) 
  
(44,192) 
  
(2,583) 
       Public asset income 
  
8,661  
  
620  
  
7,597  
  
444  
       Less: Public Saving 
  
59,040  
  
4,224  
  
51,790  
  
3,027  
  Private Asset Based Reallocation 
  
91,051  
  
3,031  
  
65,636  
  
22,384  
       Private asset income 
  
171,600  
  
69  
  
147,179  
  
24,352  
       Less: Private Saving 
  
80,549  
  
(2,963) 
  
81,543  
  
1,968  
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[Figure 11] Sources of Financing Consumption: 1996, 2000, and 2005 
 
 
 
Private transfers dominated, accounting for more than 70 percent for 1996 and 2000. 
Private transfers decreased to about 65 percent, as a source of consumption for this 
group, in 2005. The remainder consisted of public transfers, and its importance has 
been substantially increased over the periods.  
For the elderly, work contributed about 24 percent of consumption in 1996, but it 
declined to about 13 percent in 2000 and 2005. Public transfers accounted for only 20 
percent of consumption by the elderly in 1996, but jumped to about 30 percent in 
2000 and decreased slightly until 2005. Private transfers were the most important 
source of consumption for the elderly in 1996, accounting for about 37 percent. But 
these decreased to 29 percent in 2000, and further decreased, dramatically, to 1.3 
percent in 2005. The results should be interpreted with caution, however, because, as 
we pointed out above, the 2000 and 2005 data sets are not exactly comparable due to 
the changing coverage of households between two surveys, NSHIE and HIES. 
However, the results are still quite informative in terms of the direction of changes. 
For the elderly, only the importance of asset-based reallocation rose consistently.  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 
The challenges resulting from the rapid aging and extremely low fertility level 
are of great concern to Korea, simply because no other society has faced so dramatic 
a demographic transition. This paper provides insight into some important features 
of the intergenerational resource allocation in the nation before and after the 
financial crisis in 1997-98.  
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The summary and implications of the study are as follows. The results show a 
tremendous consumption smoothing and resource reallocation by age during and 
after the financial crisis. Although labor income was sluggish between 1996 and 2000, 
consumption showed a modest increase, mostly due to the increase in public 
consumption. Private education and private health consumption decreased for ages 
0-19 between 1996 and 2000. However, the decrease in private education and private 
health consumption was mitigated by the increase in the public sector consumption. 
It appears that the public sector did not only mitigate the adverse impact of 
economic crisis on consumption, but it also reduced the widening disparity amongst 
generations. Within transfers, the results suggest the public transfers increased 
substantially, while the private transfers substantially decreased for the elderly 
during and after the crisis. It also appears that social assistance benefits increased  
rapidly for all age groups.  
Perhaps the most important and striking result is that the asset-based reallocation 
of the elderly increased remarkably after the financial crisis. The increase in asset-
based reallocation was mainly due to an increase in asset income between 1996 and 
2000, but it was almost entirely due to a decrease in saving (an increase in dis-saving) 
between 2000 and 2005. It means that the elderly in Korea have some degree of 
autonomy in spite of the economic crisis, rapid population aging, and the 
deterioration of the familial support system. This is good news for Korea, because it 
means that less public resources will be required by the elderly, and that in turn will 
mitigate the financial burden caused by rapid population aging or economic 
downturn. However, the increased reliance on dis-saving will lead to a decrease in 
saving rates, which could be an obstacle for economic growth in the future. The 
sharp increase in the reliance on asset-based reallocation could be diminished for a 
while, as the old-age pension of the National Pension Scheme has begun to be fully 
implemented, starting in 2008. However, without further reforms, public pension 
funds will be exhausted around 2035. Thus, increased reliance on asset accumulation 
will be critical in the future. Exactly how all these changes will play out remains to be 
seen. 
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